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The Korean health insurance system achieved
universal population coverage within a short period of
time [1] and then integrated nearly four hundred
insurance cooperatives that had been operating
separately into a single insurance organization [2]. While
it remains controversial whether such an integrated
organization sufficiently reflects equity in the level of
insurance contributions between employees and non-
employees, it is certain that under the National Health
Insurance (NHI) scheme, an environment was created
based on which excellent domestic data processing
technology can be used. While previously, the major
concern was with how to raise funds and how much to
disburse, the task for the days to come should include
where to allocate funds in order to elevate the ‘value for
money.’
The assessment of the adequacy of medical care
introduced in the early 2000s was the first step toward the
realization of such a task, and the Value Incentive
Program (VIP) now being rapidly developed since the
latter half of the 2000s is an attempt to materialize the task
through payment incentives. The 2008-2009 Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
survey on health system characteristics [3] shows that 19
out of 29 countries had reported that they had pay-for-
performance (P4P) programs on hand. However, the
way it is implemented varies from country to country.
Recent OECD reports rated Korea high in terms of
efforts toward quality of care and P4P [4,5]. This article
proposes to design an effective P4P system in view of
recent developments in Korea and in consideration of
current trends of quality of care and P4P now underway
worldwide. 
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A national health system is aimed at improving the
health status of the population. The Republic of Korea’s
NHI scheme, as part of the health system, primarily
carries out the financing function in the system (Figure
1) [6]. The current Korean health system is designed in
such a way that the supply of medical care is entrusted to
the private sector, leaving the public sector to take
charge of the demand side through the NHI. This
suggests that the NHI plays a significant role and that the
other components of the health system do not
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comparatively attract much attention. 
The financing referred to here includes not only
collecting and pooling funds but purchasing health care
with it. In a country like Korea, in particular, where
health insurance covers the entire population, whether or
not the NHI scheme is appropriately managed serves as
a clue to whether the health system properly works.
However, while the NHI scheme has a hand in the
quality and safety of the services it covers, those services
that are not covered by the NHI have been left in the
blind spots.
Before public medical insurance started to be applied
to a segment of the nation in 1977, only a small number
of people accessed medical services. For minor diseases,
most people would drop into a neighborhood pharmacy
and buy medicines over the counter, with hospitals set
aside for serious medical situations or accessible only to
the financially well-to-do. After 12 years of partial
coverage by medical insurance, it was extended to the
entire population in 1989. However, the benefits from
medical insurance were still very limited, with the
number of days available for health care services also
limited, and many services and medicines left
unavailable. Since health insurance benefits were made
based on the insurance contribution rate, services were to
be expanded as far as contributions allowed. Limited
reimbursement was taken for granted since the
contribution rate in those days stood at a slim 3%. Later,
since the mid-1990s, insurance benefits were rapidly
expanded, to the point where there was virtually no
limitation on the number of days reimbursed by 2000.
Now, the public mentality has shifted to the point where
it is taken for granted that medical fees are reimbursed
by the NHI without any warrantable ground. 
In the early 2000s, two major reforms, including both
the pharmaceutical reform and the reform of health
insurance integration, were implemented. The
pharmaceutical reform could be justified in that the
misuse and abuse of antibiotics could be prevented by
separating the prescription and dispensing of drugs, thus
directly affecting the quality of health care and the level
of health of the population. While diverse views remain
to be examined as to the extent to which the
pharmaceutical reform contributed to the safety of
medicines, it is obvious that a policy basis on which to
move forward positively has gained ground [7]. The
reform of health insurance integration concerns
financing and governance. Though not directly
connected to the quality of health care and the health of
the population, it is not unrelated to them on a long-term
basis. While at the time when health insurance was
mapped out and expanded, the focus was largely on
“collecting” money, the focus now is on how to
“appropriately purchase” health care. For evidence-
based strategic purchasing, an integrated organization
covering the entire nation rather than multiple small
organizations would be a better platform [2]. The Health
Insurance Review and Assessment Service (HIRA)
founded separately in 2000 during the integration reform
seems to have a major role to play in making such
purchasing more strategically.
Figure 1. Functions and goals of health system [6].26"-*5:0'$"3&
To attain the objectives of the health system, health
care should be provided that is effective and safe while
meeting the needs of patients. This is enabled by
appropriately compensating providers for quality of care.
However, it is not simple to measure the quality of care,
which is complicated and multi-dimensional by nature. 
I. Quality Assessment and Quality Indicators
in OECD Countries
It is the United States that is on the forefront of
developing evaluation of quality of care. Competing
private insurers have attempted to attract customers by
providing high quality medical care for the insured,
which could be fulfilled by evaluating the quality of
medical institutions and the medical care they provide.
The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) mapped out formats
whereby medical institutions can submit data, but to no
avail, since medical institutions found it difficult to
follow those formats and shied away from joining the
program. JCAHO’s Oryx Initiative was introduced
which sought to integrate outcomes and other
performance measurement data into the JCAHO’s
accreditation process. This got somewhere in collecting
information for the evaluation of quality of care by
showing flexibility in the way data were accepted when
basic requirements were met, though their formats
differed. On the other hand, the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ) embarked upon the
AHRQ Quality Indicators Program in 1994, which
requires hospitals to prepare and submit quality
indicators based on administrative data collected on their
own. This is made up of 14 prevention quality
indicators, 32 inpatient quality indicators, 27 patient
safety indicators, and 18 pediatric quality indicators. The
Hospital Compare Project introduced by the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Service (CMS) in 2001, a
project where clinical indicators are collected from each
hospital and published for the public with explanatory
notes, helped to motivate hospitals to enhance quality of
medical care by informing patients and insurers of
criteria for selecting hospitals.
Endeavors to collect quality indicators with the
country as a unit for international comparisons have
been made by the OECD. The OECD built a basis for
the collection of quality indicators through Health Care
Quality Indicator (HCQI) in 2003 [4]. In less than ten
years, it has grown into a robust and sustainable effort to
provide internationally comparable data on quality of
care. It now brings together a large number of OECD
and non-OECD countries, international organizations
including the World Health Organization, European
Community, International Society of Quality in Health
Care and the European Society for Quality in Health
Care [8]. Quality indicators collected are largely
concerning clinical effectiveness. Much work remains to
be done before the project will have achieved its ultimate
goal of providing usable information for evidence-based
policy decisions. Many priority areas in health care are
still not covered by the existing HCQI indicators, either
because of data limitations or because of gaps in
measurement science.
II. Quality of Care in Korea
A. Hospital accreditation 
Disclosure of quality of care to the public enhances
consumer awareness and enables the patient to make an
informed choice. This stimulates medical care providers
to enhance the quality of care. Hospital accreditation has
been performed by the Korean Hospital Association
(KHA) and the Korean Medical Association since the
1960s. In 1985 a hospital standardization program was
introduced. However, it was with the turn of the
millennium that quality of care emerged as a policy issue
and the quality of medical services started to be officially
evaluated. The Korean Institute for Healthcare
Accreditation (KOIHA), which was established in 2010,
collects data and reports from medical institutions for
accreditation. The Ministry of Health and Welfare makes
public the results of quality assessment of 450
emergency medical institutions every year based on the
Emergency Medical Service Act.
B. Publishing information on quality of care extracted
from insurance billing claims
One of the primary functions of HIRA is to evaluate
the appropriateness of medical care claims. HIRA’s
mission of quality assurance and cost-effectiveness is
based on the law. An information infrastructure for
quality of care began to be built in 2001. HIRA started to
publish a list of high performing providers on its website
in 2005, compiling a broader list including providers
with both positive and negative results in 2006. Later on,
the assessment lists continued to be expanded. This
paved the way for the introduction of a hospital rating
system, in which hospitals are rated on a scale ranging
from one star through five stars. HIRA is now
publishing the average cost, length of hospital stay, and
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number of nurses per patient in 38 categories of surgical
procedures.
With information technology highly developed in
Korea, the country already introduced an electronic data
interchange (EDI) billing system in 1990s and most
medical institutions are now doing billing through the
EDI. An electronic medical record system has also been
in use and has been combined with the EDI system.
Since a patient is identified against the national
identification number, medical access is traceable patient
by patient no matter what medical institution the patient
has visited. This makes it possible to calculate quality
indicators of a wide scope. Korea now ranks among the
world’s most advanced group of countries with regard to
the scope covered, continuity in time-series, and
timeliness of the indicators [4,5]. 
Not a few quality indicators related with acute care,
long-term care, and prescription of medications are
currently available. Such indicators are nationwide in
scope and time-series data has been built for most of
them. HIRA is now conducting surveys on hospitals to
verify and supplement administrative information from
medical bills, and to fill in missing information. Such
validation work under way through differing data
sources makes it possible to carry out quality control on
data and indicators. However, doctor’s clinics are
excluded from such surveys. 
Such information has not been fully used for the
enhancement of quality of care of medical providers.
The information collected has not been sufficiently fed
back to medical providers in a format needed and
applicable, thus failing to stimulate them to enhance
their quality of care. This gave rise to the introduction of
the VIP in 2007 in an effort to correct the situation. The
VIP was first applied to both acute myocardial infarction
and Caesarian section delivery in 43 tertiary general
hospitals. 
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P4P refers to a payment method whereby payment is
made to medical providers based on their performance.
Performance includes structures, processes and
outcomes, a concept in this sense broader in meaning
than result-based payment. P4P is differentiated from the
existing payment systems including salary, fee-for-
service, diagnosis related group, capitation, and so forth
that are based on the quantity of care. When ‘performance’
is defined as limited to ‘quality,’ P4P could be
understood as a method that complements the existing
payment method. On the other hand, when ‘performance’
is defined as combined ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’, P4P
could be interpreted as a substitutive payment method. 
P4P is expected to help close the ‘care gap’, i.e. the
difference between the best care and the actual care [9].
Though P4P pays based on the values of quality
measured, whether it actually causes the quality of
medical care to improve has yet to be further substantiated
scientifically and analytically. While we need to wait
some time before it is substantiated since the matter came
to the fore recently, it is essential to monitor the trend of
P4P programs worldwide, particularly in OECD member
countries.
I. Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development Survey
According to an OECD survey [3], pay-for-
performance schemes have been introduced in several
OECD countries in which third-party payers offer
financial incentives to providers in exchange for the
achievement of agreed quality-of-care targets. Twelve
countries have reported the existence of bonuses for
primary care physicians. Bonuses are linked to quality
targets in preventive care and in the management of
chronic diseases in seven countries (Poland, 80% of
primary care physicians’ revenue; Czech Republic, 5%
of primary care physicians’ revenue; Belgium, 2% of the
revenue of 90% of primary care physicians for the
management of chronic diseases; United Kingdom, 15%
of primary care physicians’ revenue for prevention,
chronic disease management and patient satisfaction). In
France, a P4P scheme was introduced in 2009: a
generalist can sign, on a voluntary basis, individual
contracts with the health insurance fund (Contrats
d’amélioration des pratiques). These contracts provide
additional payments for the achievement of targets
related to the quality of care (preventive activities,
compliance with evidence-based guidelines) and related
to the efficiency of drug prescription (share of generics
in some therapeutic classes). At the end of 2009, about
one-third of all generalists had signed such agreements.
Eight countries reported the existence of bonuses for
specialists (United Kingdom, 68% of National Health
Service [NHS] consultants [specialists]) for preventive
care and the management of chronic diseases; Poland,
5% of the specialists receiving bonuses amounting to 5%
of their revenues). Six countries reported the existence of
bonuses for hospitals (Luxembourg, 9% of hospitals
receiving bonuses amounting to 1.4% of their revenues;%FTJHOJOH&GGFDUJWF11JO,PSFB
+1SFW.FE1VCMJD)FBMUI	

Belgium, 0.5% of hospital revenues). Only the Slovak
Republic and the United Kingdom reported bonuses
linked to all types of quality targets, i.e., clinical
outcomes, appropriate processes, patient satisfaction,
and patient experience. Ten countries indicated that
physicians can incur penalties when volume targets are
exceeded. In seven countries, penalties would take the
form of reduction in physicians’ fees. In three countries,
the Czech Republic, Finland and Italy, penalties would
consist of partial refunds to health insurance funds.
The initial results of P4P programs were positive and
efforts for measuring quality were found to increase
among payers and providers [10]. In the California P4P
program, which began in 2003, clinical performance
improved an average of 3 percentage points per year
[11]. The largest change was groups adopting specific IT
activities. Health plans are, however, less motivated to
participate because quality improvements are not large.
UK’s Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF), which
began in 2004 as a voluntary incentive pay program for
general practitioners with almost universal participation,
increased the rate of improvement in the quality of care
initially for asthma and diabetes, but not for heart
disease, and by 2007, the rate of improvement had
slowed for each condition [12].
II. Systematic Reviews
The number of health care purchasers that have
adopted P4P for quality improvement is growing rapidly.
P4P programs are heterogeneous across countries and
among purchasers with regard to incentives, target
providers, measures for quality, etc. New programs
continue to be developed around the world at an
accelerated rate. Some studies [13,14] have demonstrated
that P4P has led to improved quality of care. 
A. Christianson et al. [15]
Christianson et al. [15] reviewed the evaluations of
recent P4P initiatives ranging from the NHS program in
the United Kingdom to a relatively small pilot program in
upstate New York. Despite considerable variation in the
contexts of the P4P initiatives, the evaluations reported
that there was significant improvement in every initiative.
The main findings in terms of specific implementation
decisions and issues are summarized as follows.
1. Level and type of payment
No quantitative results in the literature directly
addressed the level at which P4P pays to achieve desired
outcomes. In a cross-comparison of Medicaid P4P
programs, Felt-Lisk et al. [16] found that the most
successful plans with respect to quality improvement
paid the highest rewards. Rosenthal et al. [17] concluded
that paying clinicians to reach a common, fixed
performance target may produce little gain in quality for
the money spent and will largely reward physicians for
their historical performance. Lindenauer et al. [18]
reported a similar pattern for hospitals in the CMS
premier initiative.
2. Risk adjustment
There were no comparative analyses of the
implications of different types of risk adjustment for P4P
programs. However, an analysis of the UK P4P program
by Doran et al. [19] pointed out the influence of a
particular method of risk adjustment for the distribution
of P4P dollars. Physicians who were able to exclude
larger proportions of patients from the payment
calculations primarily because these patients suffered
from relatively complicated medical conditions (a form
of risk adjustment allowed under program regulations)
scored higher than did other physicians. 
3. Communication of incentives
An important part of implementing any P4P initiative
is communicating with participating providers regarding
the nature of the payments. In their analysis of several
P4P efforts implemented in Medicaid programs, Felt-
Lisk et al. [16] concluded that better results were
achieved in Medicaid P4Pprograms where there was
better communication with physicians. 
4. Cost and cost-effectiveness
Most P4P programs have not conclusively established
the contribution of financial incentives to improvements
in care processes or outcomes. Nevertheless, Curtin et al.
[20] and Nahra et al. [21] addressed this issue and found
positive returns.
5. Practice impacts
P4P programs can have impacts that are unanticipated.
Several studies have documented a variety of impacts of
this nature. Langham et al. [22] examined changes in
the distribution of financial incentive payments for
health promotion in the United Kingdom. Also in the
United Kingdom, Srirangalingam et al. [23] analyzed
how referral patterns for diabetes care changed after
introduction of the NHS’s new financial reward system.
6. Documentation improvements
Simpson et al. [24] analyzed the impact of a new
payment scheme for general practitioners on recording
of quality indicators for patients with stroke. The new
payment system, introduced in Scotland in 2004,
compensated for practices that developed an accurate )ZPVOH4VO+FPOH
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register of stroke patients and for the recording of
smoking habits, blood pressure, and cholesterol levels. 
7. Effect on physician motivation or satisfaction
McDonald et al. [25] reported that the financial
incentives in the P4P program in the United Kingdom
did not damage the internal motivation of general
practitioners, nor did physicians question the quality
targets or their implications. Gene-Badia et al. [26]
found limited effects on the quality of professional life
and on patient satisfaction.
B. Van Herck et al. [27]
Van Herck et al. [27] presented the results of a
systematic review of P4P effects and requisite conditions
based on 128 evaluation studies published prior to July
2009. A large body of evidence on the impact of P4P on
‘clinical effectiveness’ and ‘equity of care’ was found, as
opposed to less evidence on coordination, continuity,
patient-centeredness, and cost-effectiveness. The effects
of P4P interventions varied according to ‘design
choices’ and ‘characteristics of the context’. The main
results of the study can be summarized as follows.
1. Clinical effectiveness as effect finding
The clinical effectiveness of P4P ranged from
negative or absent to positive (1% to 10%) or very
positive (above 10%), depending on the target and
program. Negative results were found only in a minority
of cases [28]. In terms of preventive care, more
conflicting results were found for screening targets than
for immunization targets. P4P most frequently failed to
affect acute care. In chronic care, diabetes was the
condition with the highest rates of quality improvement. 
2. Access and equity of care as effect findings
P4P did not have negative effects on patients of certain
age groups, ethnicities, or socio-economic statuses, or
patients with different co-morbid conditions [29]. A
small difference implicating less P4P achievement for
female as compared to male patients was found [30]. 
3. Quality goals and targets as design choices
Process indicators generally yielded higher
improvement rates than outcome measures, with
intermediate outcome measures yielding in-between
rates [31]. Whereas early programs generally addressed
one patient group or focus (e.g., immunization), recent
programs have expanded patient group coverage and the
diversity of targets included. 
4. Pay-for-performance incentives as design choices
Incentives of a purely positive nature (financial
rewards) seem to have generated more positive effects
than incentives based on a competitive approach (in
which there are winners and losers) [32]. The use of a
fixed threshold versus a continuous scale to reward
quality target achievement and/or improvement, are both
options that resulted in positive effects in some studies
(UK) but no or mixed effects in others [33]. What is
clear, however, is that the positive effect was higher for
initially low performers as compared to already high
performers [34]. 
5. Healthcare system characteristics as contextual
factors
Nation-level P4P decision making led to more uniform
P4P results (as seen in the UK) [35], whereas more
fragmented initiatives led to more variable P4P results (as
seen in the USA). Based on findings as such, van Herck
[27] recommended that future P4P programs should 1)
select and define P4P targets on the basis of baseline
room for improvement, 2) make use of process and
(intermediary) outcome indicators as target measures, 3)
involve stakeholders and communicate information about
the programs thoroughly and directly, 4) implement a
uniform P4P design across payers, 5) focus on both
quality improvement and achievement, and 6) distribute
incentives at the individual and/or team level.
C. Scott et al. [36]
Six of the seven studies reviewed by Scott et al. [36]
on the effect of financial incentives on the quality of
health care provided by primary care physicians showed
positive but modest effects on quality of care for some
primary outcome measures. The use of financial
incentives to reward primary care physicians for
improving the quality of primary healthcare services is
growing. However, there is insufficient evidence to
support the use of financial incentives to improve the
quality of primary health care.
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Previously, there was virtually no payment system that
took quality into consideration. Payment was made by
quantity on the premise that medical care of the highest
quality available at the moment was provided [10].
Competition among providers was presupposed to
naturally enhance the quality of medical care. However,
with such a belief being questioned on the one hand and
some conditions for the evaluation of quality being met
on the other, compensation for quality is now being
emphasized with the turn of the 21st century.An analysis of the results of the Korean VIP program
for the period 2007-2008 showed that the total score
recorded in terms of acute myocardial infarction rose by
1.55% and that of Caesarian section delivery declined by
0.56% [5]. Differences among the providers have also
narrowed, and in the group belonging to the lowest level
the situation has noticeably improved. However, since
those facts and figures were drawn from some of the
hospitals at the initial stage of the program, it is
premature to generalize the findings as universally
applicable. It is to be further monitored whether VIP
leads to the enhanced quality of care expected from P4P. 
The framework of the P4P program can be divided
into three parts: measures, basis for reward and reward
[37]. The effective P4P system of the Korean National
Health Insurance will be suggested, centering around
those building blocks. 
I. Measures
The ‘principal-agency problem’ arising from
asymmetry of information [38] and ‘the third-party
payment problem’ [39] in medical care make the
generation of the P4P structure complicated. The three
entities of medical care, i.e., patients, providers, and the
insurer, differ in their levels of medical knowledge, and
in the goals they seek. Such a situation could be resolved
if quality of care could be quantified objectively and
measured by means of clear-cut indicators. The task atop
the list of priorities in the days to come is to develop
quality measures, secure data and information to this
end, and build a stabilized, workable mechanism for the
task. 
A. Efficiency and quality measures should be created
and electronic patient history records be built
P4P targets should be selected and defined on the basis
of baseline room for improvement, and process and
intermediary outcome indicators be used as target
measures [27]. Measures are largely divided into that of
efficiency and of quality. The efficiency measure is
about how much the cost is cut down while maintaining
quality of the same level. The quality measure is
generally regarded to have the paradigm of structure,
process, and outcomes [40]. Considering the current
level of information, P4P mostly uses process indicators
as the quality measure. The intermediary outcome
indicators, at best, are used as outcome indicators. Blood
pressure and cholesterol level are such examples.
Though it is generally agreed that P4P is effective in
compensating for prevention and public health service,
performance measures employed are intermediary, not
final, outcome indicators such as whether cancer
screening test is made or not. For the P4P program to be
effective in Korea, the Korean NHI will need to expand
outcome indicators.
Electronic patient history records should be built to
upgrade quality indicators a step further. With national
identification numbers already on hand, they are not
technically difficult to form in Korea. Health services
can be linked to drug use, which in turn can be linked to
diagnostic and other test results. This will prevent
mishaps due to abuse or misuse of medicines and save
costs involved in duplicate services. At the same time,
there could be privacy concerns. Measures to safeguard
and control the disclosure of patient health information
should be mapped out in close consultation with
consumer groups. 
B. Safety indicators should be monitored and patient
experience indicators be standardized
Indicators showing patient safety and patient
experience are also important in addition to indicators
showing clinical effectiveness. Though the seriousness
of adverse events often comes under discussion,
information on them is hardly available on the insurance
billing claims. In Korea, where the majority of hospitals
are privately owned, it is more difficult to gain access to
information on adverse events, compared with Western
countries where the majority of hospitals are public or
non-for-profit. However, large hospitals have internal
mechanisms through which to monitor the safety of
patients and adverse events on their own initiatives.
Various measures should be taken so that small- and
medium-sized hospitals may also introduce such
systems whereby safety and adverse events are
monitored and reported on. A complementary
mechanism needs to be established whereby medical
professional associations may investigate and examine
professional misconduct and patient feedback, and report
on such adverse events.
Some OECD member countries have surveyed patient
satisfaction, calculating experience indicators at the
national level, and these are used for international
comparisons. In Korea, patient experience indicators are
used as a major standard in the hospital accreditation
program by the KOIHA as well as in the hospital
standardization program by the KHA. However, since
those indicators are not standardized, values that may be
gained through hospital-to-hospital comparisons are
halved. Standardization of indicators and continuous
surveys need to be written into law. 
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C. P4P indicators should be widened and monitoring
and reporting program be expanded
P4P indicators need to be integrated into a wider
health system context [41]. The UK QOF Project has
shown the benefits of using a wide range of indicators.
Perverse incentives have been avoided that would result
from a narrow approach to health care quality. For this to
happen, a monitoring and reporting program now
underway centering around university hospitals should
be expanded to cover small- and medium-sized
hospitals. Linking accreditation or reporting to financial
incentives could be a possible choice. In addition, as van
Herck et al. [27] suggested, the programs need to be
refocused timely when the goals fulfilled but scores on
old targets should be kept monitored to see if the
achieved results are maintained.
II. Bases for Rewards
Bases for rewards, as the second component of a P4P
scheme, include the absolute level of the measure
(quality achievement), and a change in the level, or the
ranking (quality improvement) [42]. Quality
improvement seems more desirable than using the
absolute level alone. This is not optimal in that those
staying on a low level are disadvantaged while those
having historically performed above the targeted level
will have no incentives to improve. Rather, a
combination of both achievement and improvement is
most likely to support acceptance and to direct the
incentive to both low and high performing providers
[27].
Some have worried that P4P could further aggravate
the unequal accessibility of medical care. Prioritizing
quality improvement for underserved populations is not
technically easy. Granted, low rates of co-payment
applicable to medical care in public health centers or to
medical care for the aged are serving as an incentive
motivating the underserved population to use medical
care.
III. Rewards / Incentives
Forms of rewards/incentives, as the third component
of a P4P scheme, are dependent on their objectives and
contextual characteristics [43]. They could be financial
or non-financial, or a combination of both. Financial
rewards could be a lump-sum or an increase in the rate
of payment. Non-financial rewards, which could take
various forms, could not only influence the reputation of
the medical institution by publishing the ranking itself
but affect finances as they influence the number of
visiting patients. According to an OECD survey [3], the
share of the physician and hospital earnings represented
by the bonus payment was generally 5% or less. Many
P4P programs in the US make use of a remarkably low
incentive size (mostly 1% to 2% of income) [44].
Further research is required to find a sufficient incentive
size to lead to the intended effect.
It is under discussion whether to pay the medical
group or institution, or its individual health care workers.
Some authors have stressed the enabling role at an
institutional level to control the rewards to individual
workers [45], while others, the importance of
incentivizing providers individually or at a team level
[27,46]. However, it would be difficult for the Korean
health insurance to take the former position since it has
been made a principle that the insurer pays the
institution, which in turn pays individual workers
according to its internal standards.
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This article reviewed changes in the issues associated
with quality of care in the Korean health insurance
system, and envisioned a picture of effective P4P in
Korea taking into consideration quality of care and P4P
systems in other countries. The main findings and
suggestions are as follows. First, the task atop the list of
priorities is to develop proper measures for both
efficiency and quality. For quality indicators to be
upgraded a step further, electronic patient history
records should be built in the near future. Safety
indicators need to be monitored and patient experience
indicators be standardized. Second, as for bases for
rewards, a change in the level or the relative ranking
seems more desirable than using the absolute level
alone. Third, rewards could be financial or non-
financial, or a combination of both. They could be a
lump-sum or an increase in the rate of payment.
Further research is required to find a sufficient
incentive size to lead to the intended effect. The insurer
can pay to the institution, which in turn pays to
individual workers according to its own standards.
To be included in the next phase of the VIP would be
expanding the program to small- and medium-sized
hospitals and other disease categories, and elevating the
level of applicability of incentives. For this,
stakeholders should be involved and in communication
through the whole process. Performance indicators
need to be monitored on a continuous basis. It is%FTJHOJOH&GGFDUJWF11JO,PSFB
+1SFW.FE1VCMJD)FBMUI	
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important to allocate sufficient time and resources to
ongoing management of the program. Most important,
high-quality quality indicators for clinical care should
be mapped out by combining claims information and
information available in registries. When such a basis
has been provided to some degree, national health
system performance reports should be published
periodically by combining such quality indicators and
data on inputs of the health system as well as medical
expenditures. This in turn will function as a strong
catalyst for the progress of quality indicators.
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